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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-AVAILABILITY OF CoRAM NOBIS IN FEDERAL CASES 
INVOLVING RIGHT OF CouNSEL-ln 1939 Robert Morgan pleaded guilty to a 
charge of mail theft and was sentenced by a federal district court to four years 
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imprisonment. He served the term and was released. In 1950 he was convicted 
of a crime in New York state and sentenced as a second offender1 because of 
his previous federal conviction. In 1952 he made application to the district court 
of original sentence for a common law writ of coram nobis, seeking an order 
vacating and setting aside his conviction by that court on the ground that he 
was not given assistance of counsel and had not waived his constitutional right 
to such assistance. His motion was denied. Reversed by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit and remanded for hearing.2 On certiorari to the Supreme 
Court, held, Morgan was entitled to show by a motion in the nature of a writ 
of error coram nobis that the federal conviction and sentence should be set 
aside. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247 (1954). 
The writ of error coram nobis is a common law writ of ancient vintage. It 
was designed to allow attack, after the term of court, on a judgment rendered 
in the context of a fact which, unknown to the court and not appearing in the 
record, constitutes an error of such fundamental nature that it invalidates the 
court proceeding and the judgment it produces.8 It is addressed to the trial 
court and is based on error of fact, not law. The history of the writ in the fed-
eral courts is a spotty one although it was recognized in a civil case as early as 
1833.4 As late as 1914, the Supreme Court refused to pass directly on whether 
it was available in federal courts in criminal cases,5 and later statements of the 
Court cast considerable doubt on its applicability.6 The lower federal courts 
appear to have admitted its availability in cases arising since 1931,7 and in 1944 
it was first granted in a case involving a claim of denial of right of counsel.8 
The picture was further complicated, however, in 1948, when 28 U.S.C. §2255 
was enacted.9 Section 2255 states that prisoners in custody under a federal 
sentence who claim the right to release because of violation of their constitu-
tional rights, because of lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or because 
their sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may make a motion to 
1 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) c. 88, §§1941-1942. 
2 United States v. Morgan, (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 67; the case is noted in 53 
CoL. L. REv. 737 (1953) and 66 HAnv. L. REv. 1137 (1953). 
3 FRANK, CoRAM NoBIS (1953); Freedman, "The Writ of Error Coram Nobis," 3 
TEMPLE L.Q. 365 (1929); 20 VA. L. REv. 423 (1934). 
4 Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 142 (1833); Bronson v. Schulten, 
104 U.S. 410 at 416 (1881). 
5 United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 35 S.Ct. 16 (1914). 
6 See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 at 475, n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1330 (1947). 
7 Strang v. United States, (5th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 820; Robinson v. Johnston, 
(9th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 998; Tinkoff v. United States, (7th Cir. 1942) 129 F. (2d) 
21. 
s United States v. Steese, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 439; Roberts v. United States, 
(4th Cir. 1946) 158 F. (2d) 150. 
9 The Reviser's note states, "This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure 
in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy 
for correcting sentences without resort to habeas corpus .••. " Reviser's note to 28 U.S.C. 
(1952) §2255. 
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the sentencing court to have the sentence set aside, vacated, or corrected. Sev-
eral of the circuit courts seemed to assume that it superseded the common law 
writ of coram nobis and, at the same time, limited this type of relief to those 
persons actually in custody under federal sentence.10 The Morgan case defi-
nitely restores coram nobis as a concurrently available remedy, and seems to 
limit section 2255 to the special case of a motion by an inmate of a federal 
prison.11 
If common law coram nobis is presently available in federal courts, there 
might still be a question as to whether failure to advise of the right of counsel 
or improper waiver of such right are proper grounds for the motion. Such 
grounds were not among those traditionally recognized by the old cases.12 
However, the Supreme Court has stated its opinion that coram nobis, if avail-
able at all, would be available in a case in which the error was so fundamental 
as to render the trial proceeding irregular or invalid,13 It has also held that 
violation of the Sixth Amendment guaranty of right of counsel14 destroys the 
jurisdiction of the trial court. It appears, therefore, that such a violation is a 
proper ground for coram nobis, and it has been so held by lower federal courts.15 
Even if the Court is right in concluding that coram nobis still exists and that 
lack of counsel is a proper basis for its application, it nevertheless appears that 
the Court has overlooked another factor in the history of the writ in federal 
courts. United States v. Moore16 established rules to be observed in granting 
coram nobis, and the Supreme Court has upheld these rules in a previous 
decision which has never been overruled.17 The rules are (I) the applicant 
must allege his innocence, or set forth a meritorious defense of which he was 
deprived by lack of counsel, and show that this defense would have resulted in 
a different verdict from that given; (2) the applicant must show reasonable 
diligence in presenting his claim; (3) the applicant should raise the question at 
10 Crow v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 704; Lopez v. United States, 
(9th Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 707; United States v. Lavelle, (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 
202; United States v. Bradford, (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 197. But see United States 
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 at 219, 72 S.Ct. 263 (1951), in which Chief Justice Vinson 
reviewed the legislative history of §2255. 
11Accord: Howell v. United States, (4th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 213, cert. den. 337 
U.S. 906, 69 S.Ct. 1048 (1949); Farnsworth v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 198 F. 
(2d) 600; United States ex rel. Lavelle v. Fay, (2d Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 294. 
122 BrsHoP, Nnw CRIMINAL PnocE.DUIUl, 4th ed., §1369 (1895). 
13 United States v. Mayer, note 5 supra, at 68. 
14 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right • • . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT., Amend VI. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458 at 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1937); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 at 76, 62 
S.Ct. 457 (1942). Fellman, "The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts," 30 
NnB. L. REv. 559 (1951). 
15 United States v. Steese, note 8 supra; Roberts v. United States, note 8 supra. 
16 United States v. Moore, (7th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 102, cert. den. 334 U.S. 849, 
68 S.Ct. 1500 (1948). 
17Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1711 (1947). 
1954] RECENT DECISIONS 147 
the time of his conviction as a second offender or be estopped from doing so.18 
In the Morgan case, the motion was not made until twelve years after the 
original conviction and fourteen months after the second conviction; moreover, 
the petitioner did not allege his innocence or any defense of which he was 
deprived in the first case.19 Of course, if lack of counsel is so fundamental an 
error as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, it would seem that a conviction 
under such circumstances should fall regardless of the state of the petitioner's 
innocence.20 The inconsistency between United States v. Moore and the prin-
cipal case indicates that it would be in order for the Court to define more 
adequately the ground-rules which are to be used in the granting of coram 
nobis. If it is brought back to life without proper safeguards and limitations 
on its use, the federal courts may be Hooded with motions to set aside ancient 
convictions, and no conviction, even after sentence is served, will be free from 
possible later attack. 
John Leddy, S.Ed. 
lS United States v. Moore, note 16 supra. Accord: United States v. Rockower, (2d 
Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 423, cert. den. 337 U.S. 931, 69 S.Ct. 1484 (1949); United 
States v. Bice, (4th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 843; Bowen v. United States, (5th Cir. 1951) 
192 F. (2d) 515. Contra: United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. 
(2d) 742; Allen v. United States, (D.C. Ill. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 866. 
19 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 at 514, 74 S.Ct. 247 (1954). 
20 Allen v. United States, (D.C. Ill. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 866 at 869: "A guilty 
person in custody pursuant to a void judgment, is just as improperly deprived of his liberty 
as is an innocent person. . • . A void judgment is as void today as it was twenty years ago." 
